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Abstract
This paper focuses on the interaction between the legacy of institutional arrangements
and incentives on long-term development. We recalled two studies focusing on the long
term effects of geographic discontinuities in colonial practice in India and Peru and we
confronted the two historical cases as to emphasise the role of capital accumulation and
equality of distribution. Furthermore, we propose an evolutionary game model to capture
the evolutionary dynamics of institutional assets defining egalitarian or iniquitous income
divisions in a non-cooperative setting. This framework sheds light on the role of the colonial
governments in the interaction between local institutions and foreign colonial rule in terms
of distribution, resources extraction, social asymmetries and finalised investments.
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1 Introduction
The thesis according to which colonial policy and practice had an impact
over its former subjects is robustly documented by many authors both em-
pirically and theoretically. Some studies employed diverse historical examples
as natural experiments trying to capture the lasting modifications in wealth,
education or investments, correlated with the presence of a protracted time
of colonial rule (Nunn 2009; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Huillery 2009; Berger
2008). Economic models at the same time try to explain several aspects of
the institutional interactions in colonial and post-colonial economies. One
aspect that draws attention is concerned with the impact of some exogenous
institutions on development, which is inserted in the more broad discourse
on institutional effects on long term growth (Acemoglu et al. 2005). Colonial
European activities do fit in this framework: they are useful for the exoge-
nous nature of their interaction with the colonised country and the usually
richer data that can be collected both for colonial and post-colonial times.
Understanding colonisation as a process and insulating some of its persistent
features might then cast some light on its influence on the institutional setting
of the colonised country. The reason for this enquiry is not only descriptive:
unequal institutions seem to be responsible for suboptimal development pat-
terns, and some of them might explain well a shift toward underdevelopment
of previously promising regions. The implications are thus both of historical
and economical interest.
One of the modelling approaches in use for institutional transition is con-
cerned with the interaction of large populations trying to coordinate over a
particular kind of ”contract” (Belloc & Bowles 2013). These models display
coordination failures leading to suboptimal choices in terms of development
strategies and surplus optimization. Of similar fashion but different impli-
cations are models where the intergenerational evolution of traits selects a
given pattern. On the other hand much of development economics modelled
the dynamics of accumulation and in a rather mechanical way: the produc-
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tion functions and the structural nature of an economy play a central role
while the interaction among different actors is reduced to a minimal level.
The way by which we define the process of pay-off formation and the factors
involved influence the coordination process and the connected dynamics. In
order to specify their structure we must insulate some aspects deemed rel-
evant. This to clearly define what are the influences colonization had over
long term development. In this sense we should move to listing some peculiar
features of colonisation by taking examples from the historical and econom-
ical literature.
Historical examples, even if non-exhaustive, are important for two reasons:
firstly they provide well documented natural experiments; secondly they al-
low, by a comparison of the apparently different stories they tell, for a search
of some common and underlying mechanics. These mechanics involve dif-
ferent levels of analysis, such as the nature of investments and economic
efficiency, government regulations or geographical factors (Acemoglu 2005).
Some elements however seem to be more relevant than others as they shape
the very core of the capitalistic process of capital accumulation and invest-
ment. For example some attention has been devoted in the past to the ques-
tion of whether legal systems (e.g. civil law systems or common law ones)
had an impact on the development of many countries, but evidence suggests
a modest impact (Acemoglu and Johnson 2004). Domestic institutions on
the other hand seem to account well for many phenomena (Nunn 2009).
2 The example of colonial India and Peru
In the debate concerning the long effects of institutional and political choices
on socio-economic trends, India is an interesting case as it offers good data
over a relatively long period of time. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) studied the
long term development effects of the land revenue system deployed by the
British rule in colonial India. They carried out some econometric analysis
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of data coming from different districts under British rule, which still almost
persist in their original geographic shape. Their analysis displays evidence
that divergence in their long term development is well explained by the in-
stitutional asset of land tenure that was chosen by the British Empire at
the time it started taking a strong grip over India. In fact the land revenue
systems and local political organizations might have had a key role in the
development of some significant pattern features of current and past socio-
economic indexes and performances, which greatly diverge and are correlated
with these early regulations. As the authors note, land taxation was a funda-
mental source of revenue for governments in India, since Mughal times in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Land tenure systems can be grouped
into three branches, of which only two are analysed in depth in the article:
1. The zamindari or malguzari systems, landlord-based;
2. The raiyatwari system, an individual cultivator-based system;
3. The mahalwari system, village-based.
The third kind of system is not central in the authors analysis, but was
present and implemented in many areas.
The landlord structure was rather feudal in form and revenue-rights could be
transferred in ways not dissimilar to property rights. In a successive moment
some norms to protect the peasants were introduced, as initially the land
under the jurisdiction of landlords was administrated with little regard for
the workers. Differently, where the raiyatwari system was adopted the rev-
enue settlement was made directly with the individual raiyat or cultivator.
The system, moreover, greatly favoured the development of a more com-
plex, rights-oriented and cooperative environment because of the different
and more centrally defined institutional and normative actions undertaken
by the British.1 Finally, the village-based system took different shapes: the
1In fact: “In these areas, an extensive cadastral survey of the land was done and
a detailed record-of-rights was prepared, which served as the legal title to the land for
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composition of the body responsible for the requested revenue varied from
one-person managed villages, which were de facto landlords, to several people
ones. In the several people arrangement each member was responsible for a
given share of revenue, either based on ancestry or linked with the possession
of land. The latter was calculated on fair criteria according to stated rules,
in a similar manner as in the raiyatwari system.
What emerges from the description given is a well-defined and sharp dif-
ference between the landlord system and the raiyatwari system. The latter
having more responsibilities, guarantees and managerial freedom on single
cultivators than the locally and unequally centralized landlord form. The au-
thors emphasise the relative better performance of non-landlord areas where
the differences in development indexes are robust if checked for geographic or
demographic factors, or for productivity. What is more, landlord areas were
usually more fertile and productive, with higher population, and hence not
a priori disadvantaged or poor in relative performance. We recall here some
aspects that are worth analysing: firstly, landlords and non-landlords sys-
tems had differences in the distribution of wealth, with non-landlords being
more equal in the distribution. This happened because of their possibility
of appropriating most of the gains in productivity, with very little reinvest-
ment (Albertini 1982, p. 27 and pp. 29-31). Secondly, in landlord areas
the power given to the landlord might have discouraged investments.2 The
authors further suggest that the disequilibrium in powers and rights might
have constituted a sense of distrust that persisted beyond the colonial time,
influencing the development and coordination between agents, for actions
of collective interest, of less equal districts. Finally, differences in the rela-
the cultivator. Unlike the Permanent Settlement areas [those of landlords], the revenue
commitment was not fixed; it was usually calculated as the money value of a share of the
estimated average annual output. This share typically varied from place to place, was
different for different soil types, and was adjusted periodically in response to changes in
the productivity of the land.” (Banerjee and Iyer 2005, p. 1193).
2“investments that made the land more productive were discouraged because of the
risk of expropriation by the landlord” (Banerjee and Iyer 2005, p.1198).
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tionship with the colonial state concerning investment in infrastructures or
policies: in fact non-landlord areas had major investments in these sectors.
It is noted however that investments in infrastructures account and explain
very little of development in the case under analysis.
We are here more interested in the structure of institutional arrangements in
these areas as a base for our theoretical analysis, rather than on the motives
that brought about different institutional assets. What is interesting is the
idea that some previous institutions might have favoured the choice of the
new. This could have happened, for example, by ways of interaction with the
given set of assumptions British officials had, for reasons of supposed politi-
cal or economic convenience, for some random and contingent developments
in the process of choice. We could devise a sort of dependence from previ-
ous conditions, as well as a certain amount of randomness, of what could
otherwise seem to be a completely exogenous choice. It could be argued
that even if the British decided on their own, they had to face the risk of
revolts (and the connected human and economic costs) and other complex
and potentially onerous transition problems from an institution to another.
These transition costs had to be taken into account and influenced the final
choice. It is not argued here that new institutions cannot be forced into
the system, without being an emerging feature of it. In fact, theoretically, a
Pareto-superior institution easily fits and overwhelms native ones as it brings
strictly positive benefits. However, in more complex situations new institu-
tions, introduced for some precise goals, might be mixed with or implemented
on previous ones in order to get the maximum result under the transition
costs (military control, suppression of revolts, less taxation etc.) and infor-
mation discrepancies that might be necessary to face to get a “better” result.
More broadly the pattern and history of taxation under British rule of India
is rather complex. If we take into account the historical evolution and praxis
of taxation by the Colonial Government of India, no easy scheme concerning
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a “colonialists exploit the country” paradigm emerges. In fact, the story is
complex and much effort was made by the British Government to treat tax-
ation as a mean of financing public expenditure and, when necessary, war
expenses. One of the aims of the colonial forces in the land was to develop In-
dian market as producer and buyer of resources. In particular many nations
where importers of India’s agricultural and industrial goods, thus making
Indian export unusual in composition for an underdeveloped country of the
time.3 Prices in agriculture also changed, fostering the generation of house-
holds surplus to be consumed in non-subsistence goods (McAlpin, 1989). We
might not think thus of colonialism as a force plainly squeezing India, but
rather one developing it for diversified needs. These needs where not in the
sole or main interest of the country, but rather those of the British Empire.
An analysis of public expenditure for matters such as education, for example,
shows the focus of the time: material and industrial development, guided by
foreign interests, rather than Indian welfare.4
It might be noted however that Taxation here is not plain surplus extraction.
The role of colonialism as oppressive extractive force might not be so funda-
mental in explaining underdevelopment. In a sense, an inefficient government
taxing with uneven structures might have well been a cause of underdevel-
opment different from the one we have evidenced. This means that when we
consider development issues, we must look at how central forces interact with
local ones shaping future interactions between agents and their productive
and social activities. This is the same when we consider India.
Finally, we might consider, as stated at the beginning of this paragraph, the
3“Although the Indian economy is generally considered today as [. . . ] underdevel-
oped [. . . ] it is by no means easy to categorize her international trade as such. [. . . ]
the commodity composition of India’s trade was much wider [than other underdeveloped
countries].” (Chaudhuri, 1989, p. 804).
4“The government spent very little on public health or education in the nineteenth
century” (Kumar, 1989, p. 935) and “Very little was spent on other social or economic
developments, such as extensions of research in agriculture, or on industry” (ibid., p. 937).
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way in which Britain thought of taxation in India and its role in the British
Empire. India was used as market and producer. The extractive policy was
one of guided development and careful design of exports and taxation. Taxes
played a great role, but might not be where to look at; policies might be the
answer: “The nationalist writers [...] treated the entire amount of export
surplus as a net drain from the country and emphasized its impoverishing
effects. But it is clear that, in order to measure the actual magnitude of the
‘drain’ [...] the cost of producing the exports must be subtracted from their
final sales value. This difference, in so far as it was paid for through internal
taxation, represents the real income leakage. In the long-run it was not so
much the capital payments as the absence of active measures for economic
development which was probably most responsible for the continuing poverty
of India.” (Chaudhuri, 1989, p. 877).
What emerges from our discussion on India, then, is the pivotal role played
by the cultural and political feelings actors formed in their minds concerning
their community and country. In fact many authors are more prone, in their
conclusions, to explain much of the differences in development as an effect of
political environment. 5 Depending on political conditions, however, some
institutions might be helpful rather than harmful, even if not intentionally
so.
A good example of this difference is given by Dell (2010). In 1545 the Potos`ı
mines where discovered in Peru, in an area close to current Bolivia. Contain-
ing the largest silver deposit in the Spanish Empire, and close to the mercury
mines of Huancavelica,6 the Potos`ı mines started a flourishing extraction of
the rare product that went on for more than two centuries. Because of the
growing demand for workers, some peculiar institutions where created to
serve the scopes of supplying silver to the empire. With little care for local
equilibria, the Spanish started a process of exploitation that lasted until the
5“ We therefore feel that the biggest piece of the story is probably the differences in
the political environment” (Banerjee and Iyer 2005 p.1209).
6Mercury was used in the process of silver refinement.
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early nineteenth century. The whole of the process influenced development
patterns in the region and country and constitutes an interesting counter
example to some potential claims on institutions that might be derived from
other historical events. In fact we will see that institutions such as haciendas,
i.e. a landlord-based tenure system, where beneficial for long term develop-
ment whenever they where implemented, contrarily to what seems to result
from other studies. After the mines discovery, villages located in the contigu-
ous region where required to provide a quota of their adult male population,
usually one-seventh, as rotating mita labourers for extracting and delivering
the minerals. This process started in 1573 and kept working for centuries.
The fraction of the population involved in the process was consistent. Local
native elites were responsible for collecting conscripts and checking the logis-
tic and control duties involved. If these community elites where not capable
of giving the required number of workers, they had to pay in silver the sum
needed to hire the labourers. Historical evidence, as reported by the author,
suggests that this rule was strictly enforced. Some communities where able
to pay rather than give conscripts, but the study from Dell focuses on regions
that did not usually pay, giving rather conscripts as primary contribution.
When the Silver deposits where depleted in 1812, the mita was abolished,
after almost two centuries and a half. Looking at the data, which comes from
records of the Spanish Empire and Peruvian Republic, Dell brings evidence
that the mita districts paid a greater price in terms of underdevelopment
after the end of the Spanish extracting institutions. In fact these areas are
currently aﬄicted by chronic underscoring when checked for some indexes of
well-being and consumption. In particular data on stunting and household
consumption shows that former mita districts behave in a sensibly worse way
than their counterparts. Because of the nature of what seems to be a strong
feature of mita on Peru’s history, this work is perfectly in line with the vast
literature on the extractive institutions influence on long-run economic pros-
perity. The emergence of discrepancies between mita and non-mita regions in
terms of development can be possibly explained by referring to two distinct
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channels: one is that of the capability of non-mita areas to get provision of
public goods; the other is the effects of land tenure systems and their evo-
lution after the end of silver extraction activities. It is important to start
from the land tenure systems implemented in the areas. Haciendas where
widespread in areas that did not feature mita policies. When the mines
where discovered the landed elite had not yet formed. As the author notes
”to minimize the competition the state faced in accessing scarce mita labour,
colonial policy restricted the formation of haciendas in mita districts, pro-
moting communal land tenure instead” (Dell 2010, p. 1865). The difference
in land tenure systems created differences in policies: haciendas where less
equal but granted secure property rights which where not so strong in mita
areas and did not protect from exploitation. These effects of security and
protection might have been beneficial for creating a humus favourable for de-
velopment, which did not exist in mita areas, where the situation worsened
after the Spanish ended the extractive processes. What is more, haciendas
where able to lobby for better infrastructures and connections. Even if not
with any public enhancement in mind, they allowed for more connections
with other markets and lasted when previous institutions collapsed, allowing
small farmers a wider access to other markets and lower costs in terms of con-
nections. Mita areas at the contrary did not receive any particular attention
in terms of infrastructures, becoming less market-connected. In addition to
this after the abolition of the Spanish mining institutions, the property rights
where not modified in mita areas and extensive land confiscation, respond-
ing peasant rebellions and banditry, which lasted till the twentieth century,
started in the area undermining secure property rights, which discouraged
public goods investments. The argument here is that landlords provided the
set for some goods and links that persisted and allowed for a better starting
condition for development: one with good infrastructures and political sta-
bility.
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It is important to note that Landlords might have not been the better insti-
tution for successful non-mita regions, that is other institutions could have
been designed with the capability of fostering development of rights, stability,
public goods and connections, all suited for explosive economic development.
Anyhow these are just conjectures, as we have very little capability of explor-
ing the potential interactions and institutions that could have emerged, were
extractive and coercive policies not implemented. We can point however that
one of the key aspects in the period subsequent to the abolition of mita poli-
cies was great political instability and social conflict, in an area that had been
exploited in a severe way. Given this, as already stated, what is important
is not describing the processes of institutional interactions alone, but also
that of transition and persistence. The main lesson the Peruvian case seems
to suggest is that transition policies implemented after the depletion of the
silver mines played much in pushing toward an underdevelopment pattern
already partially traced. What would have happened if peculiar transitional
institutions emerged, having in mind connection, cooperation and security,
lies in the realm of unrealised events and speculation.
Looking at the two phenomena, the success of certain institutions in fos-
tering development can be explained mainly by looking at their effects on
economic dynamics. These are specific to some areas where understand-
ing other institutions and their coordination, looking at incentive structures
and repressive phenomena, at conflicts between social groups and so on, can
create the right picture on which we can build a model of institutional ef-
fects on development. Therefore in our example Landlords might build the
base, both material and behavioural, for incentives toward development, or
rather destroy them by encouraging conflict, non-cooperative behaviours and
unequal distribution persisting after they are death. Institutions matter in
explaining development for their mediated economic impact, but we have
not analysed their ability to persist, and the mechanics that allow this and
create the transmission mechanism between the previous institutional con-
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dition and the new one. India and Peru then show us that what matters
is the effects on security, capital accumulation and cooperation, which in
India brought about better infrastructures and more dynamic markets, char-
acterised by trust, while landlords where worse in creating sub-institutions
and learned behaviours that persisted and affected politics; In Peru, at the
contrary, the discourse can be reverted because of the extractive policies in
the mita districts. In Peru, it could be argued, it is not inequality or equal-
ity per se that doomed the region, but an egalitarian extraction of resources
which depleted material and immaterial capital factors. Its legacy has been
misery and the predatory effects not so different from other phenomena of
severe exploitation (Nunn 2008). Additionally, landlords and their haciendas
might have granted investments and a minimal level of accumulation and in-
vestment which later brought their regions to higher development paths.
Another silent and constant actor, that created initial exogenous shocks and
then reshaped the behaviour of economic actors, is the State. In our ex-
amples it is more a third institution that coexists with the colonial forces
or can be identified with them. For practical reasons we can name ”State”
any political force, partially-exogenous and hierarchically superior to regions
and their norms, capable of reshaping formal institutional assets and some
incentive structures. It does so for its own reasons and scopes, that might
be contrary to the interests of both the dominant and lower class of a given
region. The state is thus able to influence the dynamic of institutional evolu-
tion and selection. To understand much of colonial rule and its consequences
is then to give a right form to the three actors usually involved: the colonial
state, the intermediate privileged class and the lower producing mass.
Are we comparing a minor and a major evil? In a certain sense: yes. The
real difference between the two systems is in the nature of extraction, not of
institutions. However, the pre-existence of some sort of institutions (egalitar-
ian or non-egalitarian) did influence the result of the extraction in the sense
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that some institutions were selectively favoured or adversed, or channelled
one result or another. Two channels of change are shared by the narratives:
a given degree of modified social cohesion, as a result of stronger or weaker
extraction, and horizontal or vertical institutions, as the consequence of the
bargaining of the agents in the model. They all depend on the interaction
between classes and the role of colonial forces.
3 The model
We devise an ideal country, which is composed of two social groups inter-
acting in an evolutionary non-cooperative setting. They must agree on two
possible contracts, one of which is more equal than the other. The system
employs a very simple Solow growth model to allow for some considerations
on the impact of different surplus distributions over long term development.
We distinguish between three phases in our paradigm: before, during and
after colonisation. In the first one the two classes interact in the system
trough the game and decide for one equilibrium or another. A minimum
level of capital is needed in order to start the accumulation process. This
might be due to the need for a certain exceeding amount of produce to be
reinvested in the initial capitalistic development of agriculture or other sec-
tors, as the under threshold level is equivalent to subsistence. Depending on
the distribution of capital it might be possible that not all the forces involved
are active, or even none of the social groups. As we will see, in this condition
an equality/inequality trade-off emerges which then evolves in peculiar ways
as the economy develops.
In the second phase of our model a third actor appears: the colonial state.
This force acts trough an extraction of surplus which can then be redis-
tributed or sent out of the system to the motherland. The choice of the state
for different levels of taxation depends on many factors, the main being the
political stability of the region (an unstable area brings many costs), which
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we assume is partially represented by the stability of the contractual scheme
adopted.7 Naturally, another factor is the demand of resources fuelling colo-
nial appropriation. The choice for redistribution of surplus and taxation
adopted follows some patterns which are similar to those of the pre-colonial
condition: an efficiency/equality trade-off emerges with some consequences
for the system as it evolves.
Finally, the effects of colonial rule are explored in their implications, as the
extractive policy ends giving rise to a sort of ”rebound-effect”. We will ex-
plore in detail this phase and its potential legacy for successive development
in the concluding remarks for this work. It might be remarked here that our
model does not try to capture mathematically all the subtleties of the differ-
ent interactions recalled in the literature, but might give a way of thinking
about the relationship between development patterns, institutions and colo-
nialism.
3.1 Pre-colonialism
Let α and β be two political groups playing strategies (ai, ai) i = 1, 2,
namely the peasants and the elite, which must play in an evolutionary non-
cooperative setting. Now, y being the output of a production process, payoffs
a1 =
y
2
and b1 =
y
2
for the egalitarian strategy (a1, b1) split y equally. For
the non egalitarian strategy, (a0, b0) payoffs are different as a0 = σy and
b0 = (1− σ)y with σ ∈ [0, 1]. For any strategy (ai, a−i) the payoff is zero for
both players. This simple model tries (in line with Belloc & Bowles 2013)
to capture the essentials of an interaction and potential impasse of the bar-
7The idea of the costs of instability is pretty intuitive. If we consider revolts as phe-
nomena with disruptive consequences on the productive sector and some connected costs
of military and police intervention, it becomes clear that a force which is only partially
involved in the national affairs, will protect its interests independently of many aspects
of well-being. Additionally, having as main objective stability, partial development and
colonial trade (or even colonial exploitation), the state will protect those mechanics which
allow to maximise their efficacy.
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gaining process in action in society. If modelled in a stochastic frame it tells
something concerning the speed of convergence to potential equilibria.
The output in the system is given by a Solow function in the form y =
Class β
α
y
2
y
2
0
0
C
la
ss
0
0
(1− σ)y
σy
Table 1: The contractual bargain before colonialism
f(k) = Akχ where k is capital, χ and A parameters. There exist a given
level of output y¯ such that a class starts the process of capital accumulation
and capitalistic expansion. Below that level we can either imagine that we
are close to subsistence, or that the output is not sufficient to cover the ini-
tial costs of activation of the process. We suppose that the initial level is
such that y¯ > y
2
and thus the way surplus is distributed influences the initial
development of capitalism in the kind of countries we model. This seems a
reasonable way of setting output levels as clearly had the level been inferior,
a process of accumulations would have already been occurring. It does not
imply the absence of other patterns: for example output might depend on
particularly favourable climatic factors, or on gradual modifications of the
optimal condition allowing for a sufficient technological innovation, or again
on endogenous political and economic factors other from our iniquitous orig-
inal division, such that y¯ emerges for at least one class. With that in mind
we can calculate the levels of capital for which the growth process starts.
Reminding that the level of capital changes according to k˙ = sf(k)−δk with
s ∈ [0, 1] investment rate and and δ ∈ [0, 1] depreciation of capital.
For class β the minimal level is given by the following value:
k¯ =
(
y¯
(1− σ)A
) 1
χ
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which is the one such that f(k¯) > y¯ and thus starts the accumulation process
for the whole system. At equilibrium the level of capital is given by
k˜ =
(
s(1− σ)A
δ
) 1
1−χ
Now for this level of capital we get two possibilities: either the second class
has a share big enough for it to participate in the capitalistic process, or it
is below such a level. This for α is given by
k¯ =
(
y¯
(σ)A
) 1
χ
Thus for k¯ > k˜ there is no further growth, while for k¯ < k˜ the jump to the
superior path of growth starts at k¯ leading to the equilibrium level
k∗ =
(
sA
δ
) 1
1−χ
The kind of patter we describe is based on two original conditions and then
evolves in a rather deterministic way: one, stated in the model, is that dif-
ferent levels of equality might trigger or not the process of development; the
other is that the way σ varies in time might allow the barriers to move as
both k¯ and k˜ are functions of equality. This egalitarian impact disappears
in the highest level of the Solow model, which does not take into account
distribution.8
8The idea of an original unequal distribution of capital such that the process of growth
might endogenously start, is not a novelty in economics. In fact and as an example the
evolution of pre-industrial agrarian Europe might give and idea of other factors which did
account for the passing from Malthusian societies to capitalistic ones. Brenner (1976 and
1982) and the debate on class structure and the agrarian roots of European capitalism
(Aston & Philpin 1990) are a good reference together with a more general overview as
in Hatcher & Bailey (2001). Medieval and modern Europe did differ of course from pre-
colonial societies, yet they are inspiring for many phenomena which could have started in
the east, had the interaction with external forces been less brutal.
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The model so far tells very little of long term development. It is just a frame
capable of describing something of the original distributional arrangements
in the economy and their role in starting accumulation. However the scheme
becomes interesting as the colonial forces come in. We neglect here any
transition dynamic and simply suppose that some variables are added to the
pre-colonial framework as to make it account for the interests of the colonial
state and the connected policies devised for the collection of resources. Before
proceeding it is important to point to some aspects of institutional stochastic
stability in our evolutionary framework (Young 1998).
We focus on the long-term levels of capital. Figure 1 shows an illustration
of the results of the model, where k ≡ ( y¯
A
)
1
χ is the minimum level of the of
initial capital necessary for any process of growth to start, independently of
σ; kˆ ≡ ( 2¯y
A
)
1
χ is the level of capital above which the egalitarian institution
leads to the highest level of income in the long-run. We summarize the results
of the pre-colonial society in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1.
• If k0 ≤ k, the only ESS steady state is the egalitarian institution with
a capital equal to 0 and no income for both the classes.
• If k < k0 < kˆ, for any σ ∈ [σˆ, σ], the uneven institution is ESS, and
the steady state level of capital is k = k˜.
• If k < k0 < kˆ, for any σ < σˆ, the uneven institution is ESS when
kt ≤ kˆ; however, as long as k > kˆ then the only ESS steady state is the
egalitarian institution which reaches the maximum capital level k∗.
• If kˆ < k0, the egalitarian institution is the only ESS equilibrium where
the income of the economy is at the maximum steady state level.
By looking at figure 1 then, we can study the long term consequences of the
dynamic in object. The main result is that there exist an interval of stochas-
tically stable equilibria for σ ∈ [σˆ, σ] such that inequality is persistent. What
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is more inequality is necessary to start the process of accumulation accord-
ing to our assumptions. In such a condition severe levels of inequality make
the alternative of more equal distribution stronger as the process develops,
leading to a shift to egalitarian distributions. The other SSE are in fact for
equality. The process so captured is consistent with the idea of a ”passive”
elite coordinating in a non repressive way with the subordinate portions of
the population. For extreme inequality the pressure for a shift as payoffs
evolve sounds consistent and is indirectly captured by the model. The idea
of ”repressive” elites might find its way here, after a modification of the
model or a qualitative comment, where we try to account for a myopic elite
or some costly containment of the gradual push for another institutional
scheme. However equality might not lead to the higher level of development
for a given ”stable inequality” interval, evolution to the new equilibrium
does not happen because of the uneven but originally necessary distribution
of resources: the economy is trapped in a suboptimal equilibrium.
3.2 Colonialism
Class β
α
y
2
(1− t)
y
2
(1− t)
0
0
C
la
ss
0
0
(1− σ)(1− t)y
σ(1− t)y
Table 2: The contractual bargain under colonialism
Colonialists get a share t of the total income. A fraction φ of tax revenue
is invested in the colony. Inhabitants have to share the remaining income,
that is yC = (1− t)Akχ. During colonialism the degree of inequality, σ, leads
to the payoffs in Table 2.9 In this case even if the initial level of capital is
9In a previous version of the paper, we also assumed that tax revenues can be shared
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Figure 1: Evolutionary stochastically stable steady state as a function of inequality.
Purple segments and points indicates the ESS equilibria.
very low, a sufficient level of colonial investment insures a positive long-run
steady state. In particular,
˜˜kC =
(
φtA
δ
) 1
1−χ
that holds if and only if kt ∈ (0, kC ], where
in different ways between the two classes. Let ρ measure the division of tax revenue in the
unequal contract, in this case the payoffs would be ((1 − σ) − (1 − ρ)t)y and (σ − ρt)y.
Although this parameter can help to take care of different institutional arrangements, since
the main results of the model are not crucially affected by ρ, for the sake of argument we
assume that ρ = σ.
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kC =
(
y¯
A(1− t)
) 1
χ
, (1)
Note that as long as φ and t increase, it is possible that for some values of σ,
˜˜kC > kC (See Figure 2). The presence of colonialism induces changes in both
the threshold levels for investment and the possible steady states. Indeed for
class β the minimal level of k is given by:
k¯C =
(
y¯
(1− σ)(1− t)A
) 1
χ
which is the one such that f(k¯C) > y¯ and thus starts the accumulation
process through the investment of the richest class. At equilibrium the level
of capital is given by
k˜C =
(
[s(1− σ)(1− t) + φt]A
δ
) 1
1−χ
Now for this level of capital we get two possibilities: either the second class
has a share big enough for it to participate in the capitalistic process, or it
is below such a level. This for α is given by
k¯C =
(
y¯
σ(1− t)A
) 1
χ
Thus for k¯C > k˜C there is no further growth, while for k¯C < k˜C the jump to
the superior path of growth starts at k¯C leading to the equilibrium level
k∗C =
(
[s(1− t) + φt]A
δ
) 1
1−χ
Different levels of σ determine the feasibility of poor class investment. How-
ever, this is true if and only if kt ≥ kˆC where
kˆC ≡
(
2¯y
A(1− t)
) 1
χ
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Figure 2 clarifies the comparison with the “pre-colonial” case. For any posi-
tive value of t, k¯C and k¯C move upwards. That is, for a give level of inequality,
the economy during colonialism needs a higher value of capital in order to
induce the two classes to save. Moreover, k∗C > k
∗ if and only if φ > s which
is independent of σ. On the other hand, k˜C > k˜ if and only if φ > s(1− σ).
Following the same argument of Proposition 1, we find qualitative similar
ESS steady states. However, if the economy is initially very poor, the pres-
ence of colonial investment moves the lowest ESS equilibrium to ˜˜kC > 0.
Furthermore colonialism leads to a significant increase in the stability of in-
equality. This can be easily argued from Figure 2 by comparing the two
curve segment before and during colonialism. High levels of inequality are
easily ESS during colonialism, that is σˆC < σˆ.
In this setting, parameters φ and t characterize the colonial institutions.
Given a certain value of t, any increase in φ does not influence the threshold
values k¯C and k¯C , but moves upwards all the three steady state. On the
other hand, an increase in t moves upwards the threshold values k¯C and k¯C ,
by making more difficult the internal process of accumulation. However, the
effect on the three steady states is not obvious. If φ > s, any increase in t
would move upwards the three steady states. By contrast, if φ < s, k˜C shifts
down and becomes flatter, ˜˜kC moves upwards, and k
∗
C shifts down.
We can study how changes in t or φ affect the steady states of the model and
use this analysis to derive some explanations of the stylized facts described in
the historical part of the paper. Depending on the policy inspiring colonial
forces we can construct a narrative of colonialism which is historically co-
herent even if simple. Some simplified ”kinds” of colonialism can be devised
depending on how we mix the equality/inequality factor, strong/low taxation
(extraction) and the degree of investment by the colonising force. For exam-
ple, British rule in India is one kind of colonialism where we assist to different
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Figure 2: Evolutionary stochastically stable steady state as a function of inequality.
Comparison between before and during colonialism. The magenta curve segment and the
two points indicates the ESS equilibria during colonialism.
levels of extraction or internal investment depending on the primitive level
of inequality. Keeping in mind the hypothesis for which the colonial state is
adverse to any shift of institutional asset (as it brings unwanted costs), for
unequal landlord regions investment is lower as there would be an incentive
for the elite toward an increase in inequality and appropriation of resources;
egalitarian institutions however do not present this kind of problem and allow
for both a highly extractive regime (which would be more evenly distributed)
and centrally led reinvestment.
On the other hand, the case for Peru is different: here unequal institutions
are those starting a minimal investment process, as they can avoid to give
manpower and claim some minimal infrastructures, while the colonial state
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is extracting manpower and resources (we can capture this as a sort of very
strong tax with no reinvestment). For this reason the possibility for Hacien-
das to emerge was adversed in mita areas. Other combinations are possible
but the central idea is there: the interaction between colonial forces and
the institutional pre-colonial datum can either exacerbate some conditions
or make room for tensions which explode long-after the foreign rule. For
example we stated that unequal distributions can be increased in a colonial
rule system making room for the rise of stronger elites, however when coloni-
sation ends, depending on the level of capital, parameters and the connected
shape of curves, either we jump to higher levels of capital (even if at a cost
of a transition) or fall back to lower ones.
Finally, when representing the interaction between classes and the state we
avoided any consideration concerning the level of information the colonis-
ing force has when assessing for the first time the institutional and political
equilibria between different social classes. This is rather important in giving
account of some choices the colonial forces might have done. If we consider
the existence of some information asymmetries between any social class and
the state, we can then construct some interesting relationships. In fact if the
colonial forces have to extract a given t but are unable to understand the
culture and composition of social forces, that is they cannot distinguish or
understand correctly the shape of the associated payoffs of a given equilib-
rium, a class might propose itself (or being chosen) as intermediate in the
relationship state-peasants. Let say that the ruling class is β as in our ex-
ample, and that β is the class which can discuss the extractive policy with
the state. What is more it is endowed with the control of the class α, that
is it collects the resources α has to pay to the government. Then because
the government is unable to know the exact payoff associated with a given
level of production for class α, it must rely on the information filtered by the
βs. Therefore there is an incentive for the elite toward a misrepresentation of
the payoff structure, as by doing so the βs can retain an higher share of re-
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sources and then increase their payoff. In this sense, because of the aversion
for institutional shifts of the State, they can signal higher shift risks than
necessary and hence ”contract” a lower level of t.
From this example we get an interesting insight: some equilibria endure as
they reshape the incentives for a social class by using some asymmetries in
their favour. This happens as long as the negative effect on the exploited
class are not such that a deviation is almost necessary or highly probable.
Thus we are in the case where a true lower σ is used while the central gov-
ernment sets a level of t as if capital levels and the sensibility of he system
was lower. This example applies well to the case we described for landlord
systems in India, where they had incentives to retain resources. At the same
time it explains also the indemnity mita-landlords paid the Spanish as they
could get a higher payoff from the exploitation of their lands. In this last
case they reduced their payoff but by doing so avoided an inferior equilibrium
for their social class while indirectly protecting the other. The mechanics of
transfer and compensation under information asymmetries and diversified
payoffs are an interesting variation in our model mechanic, as this example
shows, as they do account with little modifications for the persistence of some
equilibria.
Colonial forces once an equilibrium is set might introduce some incentives
that contrast potential changes as they are adverse to shifts. The incentives
might be benefits for a social class (e.g. the ruling β) or in more egalitarian
regions some investments expanding surplus extraction possibilities while in-
creasing in time the levels of payoffs. As some remarks on the case of India
and Peru showed, the existence of connected investments of colonial forces
in regions that adopted a certain convention was a key feature that might
have accounted for later development. The advantage for such a strategy is
twofold: it increases the potential gains from exploitation and allows for the
prolonged persistence of a given equilibrium. Of course in the case of strong
information asymmetries much of the effort of the State will not lie in invest-
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ing in a region, as apart from some requests of the intermediating class β, the
incentive for an increase in production is weakened by the risks of a distorted
request and the consequent share that is retained by the elite. This might be
the case for the Indian non-Landlord systems where the possibility to define
exactly the shares of t requested and the share for each farmer created an
incentive for the British Empire to invest in an increase in production, or
allow for flexible taxation.
3.3 Colonial legacy
We conclude our excursus by exploring the effect of the death of colonialism
on our idealised cases. The behaviour of the model is rather simple. If we
do not change the rules of the game, we assist simply to the disappearance
of colonial taxation and reinvestment policies. Therefore we somehow come
back to the pre-colonial condition but with some potential modifications in
capital levels and inequality: either we are at a different level such that some
evolutionary dynamic takes off, or we are still captured into pre-colonial lack
of momentum and cannot escape underdevelopment. The role of colonial
policies is that of having set or reinforced some levels of inequality and cap-
ital which might endure in our condition, long after colonialism. We move
from our previous cases. Recalling the statements of Proposition 1, Figure 2
and the fact that transitions are costly, we can proceed to list some aspects
related with our model.
In the kind of strategy describing British rule over India, if the investment
levels are sufficiently high and we are in an egalitarian condition (or quasi-
egalitarian) we reach a level such that, with no institutional transitional
effects (which are additional costs, latu sensu in the form of time of co-
ordination for example), there is a movement toward upper equilibria. As
mentioned in the historical part, some authors express doubts on the degree
of reinvestment carried out by the colonial forces. At the same time it is
stressed that other cultural and stability factors might account for long term
development. Other effects such as investments in immaterials, better taxa-
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tion policies and consequent coordination in the social network, might have
the same inflating nature of φ. The parameter might simply capture this. It
sound as forcing the model, but yet a non oppressive disposition by the colo-
nial force might still be such that, even if under-threshold in colonial times,
the base for a subsequent capital accumulation is set as when t disappears
we move to a higher level of capital.
On the other hand the strategy of unequal distribution with no strong rein-
vestment can for some values be stable under post-colonial conditions, or
lead to a shift toward egalitarian structures which however take time and
additionally, under our assumptions, are socially costly to obtain. For some
values we might even fall in a path of no investment. There is then the emer-
gence of some ESS poverty traps at non top-values of capital or even the fall
back to pre-colonial levels of capital.
The case of Peru, being harshly extractive, follows an evident pattern: if the
investment is almost null and taxation is high, equality leads to a poverty
trap both during and after colonization. What is interesting is the condition
of haciendas where, after the colonial rule ends, they might be able to keep
working on a development pattern more favourable that the one mita regions
have to follow.
The rebound effect of post-colonialism then has different consequences de-
pending on the strategies adopted and the institutions enforced. The pursuit
of stability, sporadic investments or original unequal institutional choices,
have unlikely effects in terms of development and, as pointed out in the dis-
cussion so far, depend on a mix of parameters internal to the economy, the
social contractual dynamics and historical contingencies which are partially
captured by the model.
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4 Final remarks
The legacy of institutional arrangements, and their connected incentives on
long-term development, is without doubt an important channel affecting eco-
nomic growth. We recalled two studies focusing on the long term effects of
geographic discontinuities in colonial practice in India and Peru over pro-
longed periods of time. We confronted the two historical cases as to empha-
sise what we felt was part of the underlying process: capital accumulation
and its interaction with equality of distribution. We indirectly defined colo-
nial extraction in terms of taxation or depletion, by using mainly the given
examples. In this sense we proposed a model trying to capture the evolution-
ary dynamics of institutional assets defining egalitarian or iniquitous income
divisions in a non-cooperative setting. The role of the colonial governments
and its personal strategies showed that what seems to explain well develop-
ment is the interaction between local institutions and foreign colonial rule in
terms of distribution, resources extraction, social asymmetries and finalised
investments. The key to read institutional dynamics is not the kind of social
institution in use at a given moment, but its interaction with the underlying
features of the economy. The right institution at the right time, and even its
evolution under the shock of colonisation, is the one that allows a smooth
transition into the different phases of capitalistic development.
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